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Pursuant to Rule 24(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Defendants/Appellees,
through undersigned counsel, hereby submit the following Appellees' Brief.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant Kaysville City agrees with plaintiffs statement of jurisdiction.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly grant defendants' Motion to Dismiss ruling that

plaintiffs failed to file a notice of claim with defendant as mandated by Utah Code Annotated
§63-30-13?
Orders Granting Motions to Dismiss are reviewed for correctness. Harline v. Barker.
912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996).
2.

Even if plaintiffs properly filed their notice of claim, was their suit filed within

the time period allowed by Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-15(2)? Legal conclusions are
reviewed for correctness. Harline v. Barker. 912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996). Although not
decided by the court in its ruling, this court can affirm the trial court's ruling on other
grounds, even though the trial court relied on some other ground. Debry v. Noble. 889 P.2d
428, 444 (Utah 1995).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Interpretation of the following statutory provisions are determinative of the issues on
appeal. The language of these designated statutes are set forth in the addendum to Appellees'
brief.
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

Defendants/Appellees agree with Plaintiffs5 Statement regarding the disposition in the
Trial Court.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

Defendants/Appellees agree with Plaintiffs' Statement about the Course of
Proceedings.
C.

Disposition in the Trial Court.

Defendants/Appellees agree with Plaintiffs' Statement regarding the disposition in the
Trial Court.
D.

Statement of Facts.

1.

Plaintiff Joanna Banford was the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident on

February 18, 1995 in Davis County. Plaintiff Amber Banford was a passenger in the vehicle.
(R. 2, Complaint If 7).
2.

The second vehicle in the collision was being driven by David Quinley, a

Kaysville City Police Officer, who was on duty at the time of the collision. (R. 2, Complaint

118).
3.

Plaintiffs allege that the negligence of Quinley was the proximate cause of

plaintiffs' injuries. (R. 2-4 , Complaint Ifsl0-17).
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4.

Some time between April and May of 1995, plaintiffs retained the services of

attorney Kenneth Sondgeroth of Bullhead City, Arizona. Although plaintiffs claim several
conversations occurred prior to the July 12,1995, the affidavits are largely irrelevant because
plaintiffs retained the services of an attorney who objected to direct contact between Clay
Johnson and the Banfords. No settlement agreement was reached. (R. 31-82, pg. 2 ^}6).
5.

On July 12, 1995, through attorney Sondgeroth, plaintiffs caused a letter "re:

personal injury of Joanna Banford and Amber Banford Date of accident: 2-18-95" to be sent
"to whom it may concern." and the letter was simply addressed to "Kaysville City Corp."
The letter specifically states:
We represent Joanna Banford and Amber Banford in their claim for personal
injuries sustained in the automobile collision of February 18, 1995. David J.
Quinley was driving a vehicle which you owned that was involved in this
accident.
This letter is to request that you contact or office within ten days with the
name of your insurance carrier, or to advise us of your status of insurance at
the time of the accident. Please notify your insurance company of this
accident if you have not already done so. Please have a representative of your
insurance company contact us as soon as possible but no later than thirty days
from the date of this letter. This will eliminate the need for us to contact you
further.
Thank you for your cooperation and assistance.
Very truly yours,
WEISS & SONDGEROTH
Kenneth Sondgeroth
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The letter was unsigned. (R. 24) A copy of the letter is attached in Appellees' Addendum.
6.

In response to plaintiffs' letter of July 12,1995, Dean Storey, Finance Director,

sent a letter to plaintiffs' counsel providing the requested information regarding the names
and addresses of the City's insurance carrier, City Attorney and Insurance Agent. The letter
closed by saying "please contact me as the City representative." (R. 26). A copy of the letter
is attached in Appellees' Addendum.
7.

On or about November 16, 1995, counsel for plaintiffs sent a letter to

Mr. Storey in response to his letter dated July 25, 1995. This letter is apparently the
document that plaintiff claim is their notice of claim. It is entitled "\Re: claim- Joanna and
Amber Banford." It is not entitled "notice of claim."
In the letter, Sondgeroth states:
It was with great relief that I received you letter of July 25, 1995. As
you are aware, my office represents both Joanna and Amber Banford in their
claims that arose from a vehicle accident with a member of your police force.
Clearly, as is evident from the police report, the police officer was grossly
negligent and that my clients were noting but innocent victims. ...
My purpose in writing you directly is to obtain some help with your
insurance company. Mr. Clay Stevens has been assigned this case from
Reliance Insurance Company. Unfortunately, Mr. Stevens has taken an abrupt
and confrontational attitude toward my clients which has left this office, and
Ms. Banford, faced with the prospect of filing suit to remove Mr. Stevens from
this matter. Hopefully, this will not be necessary once you have been made
aware of Mr. Stevens outrageous and unethical conduct.
On page two of the letter, attorney Sondgeroth states the following about settlement:
Mr. Stevens said he would take care of the bills and pay $20,000.00 for
all of Mrs. Banford/s damages. Mrs. Banford's injuries for her shattered knee
4

are in excess of $750,000. This is substantiated by settlements across the
nation for injuries that have required bone grafting and permanent
disablement. Potentially it could be much larger.
And on page three of the letter, attorney Sondgeroth concludes with:
Please advise whether you can help my clients gain a better attitude
from our insurance provider. In sincerely hope that we can work together to
minimize this conflict and obtain appropriate compensation for the injuries that
have occurred. This process so far has been quite intolerable.
This letter was signed. (R. 55-57). This letter is attached to Appellees' Addendum.
8.

No other correspondence was sent by counsel for plaintiffs to any represen-

tative or officer of Kaysville City during the one year period following the accident. (R. 18,
116).
9.

Plaintiff filed this action on February 18, 1997. (R. 1-4).

10.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on June 19, 1997. (R. 14-30).

11.

Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition which, among other things,

contained the affidavits of Kenneth Sondgeroth, Brian Jensen and Joanna Banford detailing
their conversations with city officials and the adjustor for Reliance Insurance. (R. 49-52).
12.

Defendants moved to strike the affidavits. (R. 84-85). Specifically, defendants

moved to strike the affidavits of Sondgeroth, Jensen and Banford because:
1.
Affidavit of Kenneth Sondgeroth is objectionable and should
be stricken for several reasons. His statement that he had several phone
discussions with Reliance Insurance and that they showed a willingness to
discuss settlement is irrelevant. The proper service of a notice of claim is
jurisdictional. The alleged statement by Clay Stevens that their was clear
liability in the matter and that the only question to be looked at was the
amount of damages is irrelevant. The statute mandates that the acceptance
5

of a claim be in writing. The claim was not acted upon and was deemed
denied. Only a written acceptance claim could salvage plaintiffs' efforts to
turn settlement negotiations into a waiver or estoppel.
2.
Affidavit of Brian Jensen is irrelevant and should be stricken.
Jensen alleged that he contacted the mayor of Kaysville who ultimately led
him to contact the insurance company whose representative indicated that
they would not pay the claim until further documentation was supplied. The
Jensen affidavit further indicates that the Banfords then obtained counsel.
This information is irrelevant. The affidavit does not allege that anyone
from Kaysville misled them into misfiling or failing to serve the notice of
claim. The affidavit should therefore be stricken.
3.
Affidavit of plaintiff Joanna Banford is also irrelevant and
should be stricken. Banford alleges Clay Stevenson, an adjuster for Reliance
Insurance, told her "that everything would be taken care o f and "our client
is at fault and we will get this settled." This is not a written acceptance of
the claim and is so vague as to be irrelevant. Moreover, plaintiff retained
counsel after this statement was made, seven months prior to the
November 16, 1995, letter. It was simply improperly drafted and served
after the alleged statement through no fault of Kaysville or Reliance.
Moreover, no reasonable lawyer would deem this verbal statement as
constituting a reason to forego the clear requirements of the governmental
immunity act. Accordingly, this statement is irrelevant. Finally statements
regarding Reliance's settlement offers and promises to pay medical bills are
inadmissable pursuant to Rules 408 and 409 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(R. 84-85)
Although the court rejected these affidavits, Defendants renew their objection to their
inclusion in Plaintiffs brief for the reasons contained above.
13.

Plaintiffs were represented by counsel at least two months prior to the July 12,

1995, letter and at least seven months prior to the November 16, 1995, letter. (Appellees
Brief, p. 3,13).
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14.

Defendants agree with the remainder of Plaintiffs/Appellants' Statement of

Facts ffif 15 through 21.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Claimants seeking relief under the Governmental Immunity Act must strictly comply
with the notice of claim provisions of the Act. Neither the letter of July 12, 1995, nor the
letter of November 16, 1995, constitute a proper notice of claim under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. Neither letter specified the necessary information to constitute
a notice of claim. Neither letter was filed with the governing body of Kaysville City as is
mandated by U.C.A. § 63-30-14(1995). Indeed, the letter of July 12, 1995, was not even
signed by plaintiffs or their attorney. The letter of November 16, 1995, fails to specify it
was a notice of claim and was not filed upon the governing body of Kaysville City as
required by U.C.A. § 63-30-13 (1995).
Even if the letter can be deemed a notice of claim, it was service of the notice upon
the city finance manager is not proper service pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-30-13 because the
letters were not directed to or served upon the governing body of the city. In this case, the
governing body of Kaysville is the mayor and city council. U.C.A. § 10-1-104(2). Service
of a notice of claim on the governing body of the entity is a statutory prerequisite to suit, and
plaintiffs' failure to do so deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction.
Moreover, the statement in a letter from Dean Storey, "contact me as the city
representative" does not create an estoppel because it was in response to plaintiffs' counsel's
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letter and did not say to file the claim with him. Because plaintiffs were represented by
counsel for at least two months prior to the filing of the first alleged notice of claim in July
1995, plaintiffs' estoppel arguments should be rejected.
In addition, the lawsuit was not timely filed. Plaintiffs suit was filed more than one
year after the claim was deemed denied. Accordingly, the court lacked jurisdiction over the
case. Plaintiff cannot salvage the process by attempting to introduce evidence of office
custom and practice. The proffered affidavits only establish general office policy and not
specific facts about this notice. Accordingly, because the letter of November 16, 1995, was
deemed file the same day it was dated and mailed, plaintiffs' suit is not timely.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROPERLY DRAFT AND
SERVE A NOTICE OF CLAIM UPON THE GOVERNING BODY OF
KAYSVILLE CITY.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, §§ 63-30-1, etseq., (hereinafter, the Act) sets
forth the procedures that a litigant suing the State of Utah, or one of its political subdivisions,
must follow. Section 63-30-11 requires a claimant to file a written notice of claim with the
government entity as a prerequisite to filing an action in court.
U.C.A. § 63-30-11 mandates that a notice of claim contain the following information:
(3)(a) The notice of the claim asserted shall set forth:
(i)
a brief statement of the facts
(ii)
the nature of the claim asserted; and
8

(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known,
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent,
attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and
(ii) directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13.
U.C.A. § 63-30-1 l(1995)(emphasis added).
The Act further provides:
A claim against a political subdivision . . , is barred unless notice of
claim is filed with the governing body of the political subdivision
within one year after the claim arises. . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (emphasis added).
Service of a notice of claim on the governing body of the entity is a statutory
prerequisite to suit, and plaintiffs' failure to do so deprives the court of subject matter
jurisdiction. Larson v. Park City Corporation, 955 P.2d 343 (Utah 1998); Bellonio v. Salt
Lake Citv Corporation, 911 P.2d 1294, 1298 (Utah App. 1996). In Bellonio v. Salt Lake
City Corp., the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's refusal to dismiss the complaint
for failure to comply strictly with the requirements of § 63-30-13, noting that:
[s]ince a Notice of Claim is a statutory prerequisite to suit, the trial court was
without jurisdiction to hear Bellonio's case and erred by allowing him to
proceed.
BelioniQ, 911 P.2d at 1298.
The notice of claim requirements in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act have
always been treated as jurisdictional by Utah courts. As the court in Nielson v. Gurley. 888
P.2d 130 (Utah App. 1994), explained:
9

The failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, and
therefore compliance with the act is a precondition to maintaining an action.

Nielson. 888 P.2d at 13; see also Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of Transportation, 828 P.2d
535, 540-1 (Utah App. 1992); Madsen v. BorthicL 769 P.2d 245,250 (Utah 1988) (improper
notice deprives court of jurisdiction).
A.

Plaintiffs Must Strictly Comply with the Governmental Immunity Act.

Before analyzing plaintiffs' failure to comply with the provisions of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, the standard of compliance must first be established. Plaintiffs
have incorrectly argued "substantial compliance" is all that is necessary. Although the
haphazard effort to file a notice of claim in this case does not even constitute "substantial
compliance," Utah appellate court decisions have repeatedly rejected substantial compliance
and specifically adopted strict compliance as the legal standard for the filing and service of
notices of claims.
In Bellonio v. Salt Lake City, 911 P.2d 1294 (Utah App. 1996), the court stated:
Nevertheless, in two recent opinions from this court, plaintiffs have been
allowed to proceed despite certain inadequacies in their notice of claim filings.
See BischeL 907 P.2d at 279; Brittain. 882 P.2d at 672-73. However, the
precedential effect of those cases is limited by their unique factual
underpinnings and, therefore, neither should be construed as an indication that
we are prepared to abrogate the long-standing rule requiring strict compliance
with all aspects of the Governmental Immunity Act.
Id. at 1296 (emphasis added).
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As the court stated in Bischel v. Meritt 907 P.2d, 275, 279 (Utah App. 1995), "Utah
courts have established a rule of strict compliance with the notice provisions of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act." See, e.g.. Yates v. Vernal Family Health Ctr.. 617 P.2d 352,
354 (Utah 1980); Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't of Trans.. 828 P.2d 535, 541 (Utah App.
1992)." (Emphasis added).
Although plaintiffs have not even substantially complied with the act, under the
clearly established standard of "strict compliance," plaintiffs' letters of July 12, 1995, and
November 16, 1995, fall far short of strict compliance as is outlined below.
B.

The Letter of July 12. 1995 Does Not Comply with the Act.

The July 12, 1995, letter addressed "to whom it may concern" failed to comply with
63-30-11. Specifically, it did not contain a the statement of facts, the nature of the claim
asserted or the damages incurred by the claimant so far as known and was not served upon
the governing body of Kaysville City. The alleged notice of claim merely states the date of
the accident, the name of the driver of the Kaysville vehicle and requests the name of the
City's insurance carrier. It contains no information regarding the facts of the accident nor
any facts about damages. It was not even signed by the claimant or her attorney.
This terse letter hardly constitutes compliance with the above provisions. The letter
failed to specify the nature of the claim, facts or damages as mandated by the above section.
Because plaintiffs failed to provide the necessary information mandated by U.C.A. § 63-3011, the court should affirm the judgment of dismissal in this case.
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Even if this letter is deemed a sufficient notice of claim, it was not properly served
upon the governing body of Kaysville. A letter addressed to "Kaysville City, To Whom It
May Concern"is not service upon the governing body.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how a letter simply addressed to "Kaysville City,
to whom it may concern" can constitute compliance with the act when this court has
rejected a much more thorough, albeit misguided, effort that occurred in Bellonio. At least
in Bellonio. the claimant addressed the letter to the Airport Authority and City Attorney.
Nonetheless, this court held notice insufficient because the notice was not filed with the
city council.
C.

The Letter of November 16. 1995. Does Not Comply with the Act.

The letter of November 16,1995, sent to Dean Storey, City Finance Director does not
constitute strict compliance with the Act. The letter of November 16, 1995, is no more a
notice of claim than any other letter sent between July 5, 1995 and November 16, 1995.
Even if the letter of November 16, 1995 contained sufficient facts to qualify as a
notice of claim, the Banfords did not file their notice of claim with the governing body of
Kaysville City. U.C.A. § 10-1-104(2) defines the governing body as "collectively the legislative body and executive of any municipality." Subsection (2)(b) defines the governing
body of a city of the third class as the City Council.
Banfords' argument that because the definition of "governing body" is not specified
in the Governmental Immunity Act excuses their non-compliance has been specifically
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rejected by the Utah Supreme Court and this court. In Larson v. Park City Corp.,955 P.2d
343 (Utah 1998), the court stated:
The Act clearly provides that the notice of claim must be filed with the
"governing body" of a political subdivision. Unfortunately, the term
"governing body" is not defined within the Act itself. However, the term
"governing body" is defined in the general provisions of the Utah Code
dealing with cities and towns, known as the Utah Municipal Code. Utah Code
Ann. §§ 10-1-101 through 10-15-6. Subsection -104(2) defines "governing
body" as follows:
"Governing body" means collectively the legislative body and
the executive of any municipality. Unless otherwise provided:
(a) In cities of the first and second class, the governing body is
the city commission:
(b) In cities of the third class, the governing body is the city
council [.]
Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-104(2) (1996). Furthermore, section 10-3-105 states:
The governing body of cities of the third class shall be a council
composed of six members one of whom shall be the mayor and
the remaining five shall be councilmen.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-105 (1996). Therefore, Larson was required to file her
notice of claim with the city council because Park City is a city of the third
class.
Larson, 955 P.2d at 345.
Similarly, in Bellonio v. Salt Lake City. 911 P.2d 1294, 1296 n.2 (Utah App. 1999),
this court specified that Title 10 governs the definition of governing body.
In this case, the governing body of Kaysville is the mayor and city council. U.C.A.
§ 10-1-104(2). Letters "to whom it may concern" or to Dean Storey, the city finance
director, do not constitute service upon the governing body of Kaysville City.
13

Clearly acknowledging insufficient service, plaintiffs attempt to excuse their lack of
compliance with the mandatory requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, § 6330-14, by raising several arguments that have been repeatedly rejected by Utah appellate
courts. Plaintiffs' specific arguments are discussed below.
D.

Actual Knowledge of the Claim by City or Its Insurance Carrier Does Not
Salvage a Defective Notice of Claim.

Plaintiffs argue that because defendants' mayor, city finance director and insurance
company had actual knowledge of the claim through phone conversations with plaintiff
Joanna Banford, her lawyer and her friend, the purposes of the Act have been met. In Busch
v. Salt Lake International Airport. 921 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1996), the court specifically held
that knowledge of the claim on the part of the city risk manager, attorney or insurance
company does not validate improper service. As the court stated in Busch v. Salt Lake
International Airport. 921 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1996):
The Governmental Immunity Act serves two important purposes. First,
it affords the responsible public authorities an opportunity to investigate,
settle, or deny a claim without expending public revenue for costly and
unnecessary litigation. Brittain. 882 P.2d at 671. Also, compliance with the
Governmental Immunity Act provides an opportunity to those vested with
authority to remedy a dangerous condition so that further damage or injury can
be avoided. S c ^ v. Southworth. 563 P.2d 192, 193 (Utah 1977). The city
recorder and city attorney are not members of the governing body. Bellonio.
911 P.2d at 1296. Unless specifically authorized by the governing body,
neither has the power to settle a claim or to remedy a dangerous condition.
We conclude that the first notice of claim served upon the city recorder
and the city attorney was not sufficient to give notice of the claim to the
governing body of Salt Lake City. To provide notice to the governing body of
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a city under the Governmental Immunity Act, a notice of claim must be served
upon the mayor or city council
Id. at 472.
Therefore, knowledge of the claim by the city finance director, the mayor and
Reliance Insurance is irrelevant. Defective service of the notice of claim is jurisdictional and
defendants have no duty to point out those deficiencies during settlement negotiations.
Accordingly, this court should hold that it lacks jurisdiction as a matter of law. Indeed, any
other holding would vitiate the notice of claim provision. Knowledge, however remote, of
a potential claim by any city official could constitute notice under plaintiffs' argument. The
reason that the court has repeatedly rejected this argument is precisely because of the lack
of certainty and confusion such a drastic departure from precedence such a decision would
cause. This court should reject plaintiffs' attempts to resurrect the "actual notice cures a
defective notice of claim" argument.
E.

Kaysville and Reliance Insurance Did Not Waive Compliance with the
Governmental Immunity Act and Are Not Estopped to Assert Jurisdiction and
Limitations as a Defense.

The Banfords have apparently argued that the verbal and written responses from
Kaysville City and Reliance Insurance constitute waiver or estoppel to deny the claim. Utah
courts have been reluctant to apply estoppel analysis to notices of claims. As recently as this
year, the court rejected a claim of estoppel in Shunk v. State. 924 P.2d 879 (Utah 1996). In
Shunk, the court rejected plaintiffs estoppel argument by holding that estoppel applies only
when an agency of the state (or political subdivision) gives erroneous information to a
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claimant which prevented her from timely filing a proper Notice of Claim. In the Shunk
case, the plaintiff failed to properly serve the notice of claim on the proper authorities. The
defendants simply did not notify plaintiff of the deficient notice. The court further stated:
Shunk points out, however that the notice of claim which he filed with the
state department of education and the attorney general contained a request for
assistance in the event that Shunk had not notified the proper governmental
entity. Where the statutes are clear, as in this case, as to the requirement that
for serving a notice on a political subdivision, we cannot require and the
statutes do not require that the state or its political subdivisions promptly
notify claimants of deficiencies of the notice of claim so as to allow them an
opportunity to timely rectify their error or deficiency.
Id at 882.
Thus, the Banfords' argument that Kaysville has waived or is estopped to assert
deficiencies is unavailing in light of the express language of this recent, unanimous decision
of the Utah Supreme Court.
Additionally, counsel cannot blame his failure to follow the statute on Kaysville.
Indeed, in this case, the first letter of July 1995 from Plaintiffs' attorney specifically asked
for information regarding the city's insurance carrier and stated "[p]lease have a representative of your insurance company contact us as soon as possible but no later than thirty
days from the date of this letter. This will eliminate the need for us to contact you further."
Apparently, no further communication was planned with Kaysville. Storey's response did
nothing to mislead counsel or otherwise validate this letter as a notice of claim. The response
did not admit liability. Plaintiffs' argument that "please contact me as the city repre-
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sentative" somehow misled them into filing a defective notice of claim is merit less. Storey
did not say, "please file your notice of claim with me."
After apparently unsuccessful negotiations with Reliance, plaintiffs' counsel sent
another letter to Storey. It is this letter that plaintiffs now claim is their notice of claim. The
letter of November 16 is hardly a notice of claim. The letter states "[m]y purpose in
contacting you directly is to obtain some help with your insurance company." Moreover,
in the letter, Mr. Sondgeroth then goes on to complain about the treatment his client had
received from Mr. Clay Stevens. Additionally, the letter states:
My letter is a direct result of this behavior on his part . . . please advise
whether you can help my clients gain a better attitude from your insurance
provider. I sincerely hope that we can work together to minimize this conflict
and obtain appropriate compensation for the injuries that have occurred. The
process so far has been quite intolerable.
The letter was not intended to be a notice of claim. In fact, this is hardly the type of
letter one would write about a claims agent who allegedly accepted liability for the accident
on behalf of Kaysville. It certainly does not indicate that Reliance lulled plaintiff or her
attorney into a false sense of complacency as is required by Rice for estoppel to apply.
Rice v. Granite School District 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969), involved an unrepresented
woman who was actively led to believe that she did not need counsel and that her claim had
been accepted. In this case, the Banfords had counsel for at least seven months prior to the
filing of their alleged notice of claim. The notice of claim simply is deficient. No amount
of good faith negotiation or discussions regarding medical records can constitute waiver or
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estoppel. To hold otherwise would bar efforts to settle cases early on if there was any
question as to the validity of a notice of claim. Moreover, the exhibits to plaintiffs'
memorandum do not demonstrate any active effort to mislead. Unlike the plaintiff in Rice,
the Banfords were represented by counsel who presumably can read the clear and unambiguous language of the statute. Reliance is under no obligation to point out deficiencies in the
notice. Shunk v. State. 924 P.2d 879, 882 (Utah 1996).
Courts have routinely held that mere communication with counsel while the statute
is running, without some active effort to mislead the plaintiffs into a false sense of
complacency, does not create an estoppel.
In Lund v.Hall. 938 P.2d 285 (Utah 1997), the plaintiff filed an action after the statute
of limitations had expired. Relying upon Rice v. Granite School District. 23 Utah 2d, 22,
456 P.2d 159 (1969), the principal case the Banfords cite in support of their claims, Lund
argued that defendants should be estopped to argue statute of limitations because "she was
involved in on-going settlement negotiations with State Farm 'immediately prior to the
expiration of the statute of limitations and that State Farm had not provided her with notice
of the running of the statute of limitations as required by law." Lund v. Hall. 938 P.2d
at 288. The court rejected the argument holding that there was nothing in the letter that
led the plaintiff to sit on her rights. Moreover the court distinguished Rice by stating,
" . . . unlike the plaintiff in Rice. Lund was represented by an attorney prior to the time
she received the letter from State Farm." Lund. 938 P.2d at 288.
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Bischel v. Merrit 907 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1995) is also inapplicable to the facts of
this case. The plaintiff in Bischel phoned the Salt Lake County Commission and was given
erroneous information on where to file her notice of claim. Bischel is distinguishable
because the defendant providing misleading information resulting in defective service of the
notice of claim.
In this case there is no evidence of false or intentionally misleading information.
Statements such as "contact me as the city's representative" by Kaysville's Storey or "I am
now handling the case" by Reliance's Letisa Mckenzie do not provide any false information
that would lead a reasonable attorney to believe that compliance with the statute has been
waived. Plaintiffs' attempt to construe statements regarding a desire to settle or vague
comments that the Banfords "would be taken care o f as creating an estoppel simply do not
meet the necessary level of evidence necessary to create disputed issues of fact.
Accordingly, Kaysville is not estopped to assert lack of jurisdiction. There is no
evidence that anyone from Kaysville provided any false information to the Banfords or their
counsel regarding the notice of claim. Neither Kaysville nor Reliance was under any
obligation to notify plaintiffs or their counsel of the deficiency in the notice of claim. Shunk
v. State. 924 P.2d 879, 882 (Utah 1996). Indeed, the letter of November 16, 1995 diverged
so far from the standard notice of claim that someone receiving the letter may not even have
realized it was a notice of claim. Accordingly, the facts as alleged by plaintiffs, even if taken
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as true, do not give rise to a material disputed issue of fact to support a claim of estoppel.
This court should affirm the judgment of dismissal.
POINT II
PLAINTIFFS' LAWSUIT IS UNTIMELY
Although not decided by the trial court in its ruling, this court can affirm the trial
court's ruling on other grounds, even though the trial court relied on some other ground.
Debry v. Noble. 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995). The untimeliness of plaintiffs' suit is an
additional ground affirming the Order of Dismissal.
Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-14 provides that a governmental entity has ninety days
to act upon a notice of claim or it is deemed denied. U.C.A. § 63-30-15 provides that a
claimant must file an action against the governmental entity within one year after the claim
is denied or the action is barred. If the July 12, 1995 letter is deemed to be plaintiffs' notice
of claim, plaintiffs' suit filed February 18, 1997, is clearly untimely. Thus, in order for the
timing to be relevant, this court would have to accept the letter of November 16, 1995, as a
valid notice of claim. That notice of claim was rejected ninety days after it was served.
Pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-30-15(2), plaintiffs' suit must be filed within one year of that date.
A.

Plaintiffs' Claim Was Deemed Denied on February 14. 1996. and the Filing
of Suit on February 18. 1997 Is Untimely Pursuant to U.C.A. S 63-30-15(2).

The Banford's suit is untimely because it was filed more than one year after it was
deemed denied. It is undisputed that the letter was dated November 16, 1995. Pursuant to
U.C.A. § 63-37-1, a notice of claim is deemed served on the date it is mailed or postmarked.
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There is no envelope and therefore the court found in its original ruling that the letter was
mailed the date it was signed, November 16, 1995. At no point was the claim accepted or
rejected in writing and the claim was therefore deemed denied ninety days thereafter.
Pursuant to U.C.A. § 68-3-7, the claim was deemed denied on February 14, 1996. Plaintiffs
did not file this action until Tuesday, February 18, 1997, more than one year after the claim
was deemed denied. The savings provisions for weekends and holidays does not apply to
this case because February 14, 1997 was a Friday. Thus, if the November 16, 1995, letter
is a validly served notice of claim, the action is time barred for failure to file within one year
after it was deemed denied as mandated by Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-15.
Plaintiffs' complaint was therefore barred by the statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs claims that Rule 6, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides a three
day period for mailing and therefore saves their case. The provision of Rule 6 does not apply
when more specific provisions are contained in the code, Maverick Country Stores v.
Industrial Commission. 860 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1993) (U.R.C.P., Rule 6(e), three-day
mailing provision, does not apply to time period to file an appeal of industrial commission
order).
In this case, a more specific provision specifies when a notice of claim is deemed
filed and specifically accounts for mailing.

Rule 6 is inconsistent with the express

language of U.C.A § 63-37-1. Therefore, the provision of Rule 6, providing for an
additional three days for mailing is inapplicable due to a more specific provision of U.C.A.
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§ 63-37-1. Thus, even if plaintiffs properly filed a notice of claim on November 16, 1995,
the suit is still untimely.
B.

The Trial Court Correctly Disregarded the Affidavits of Kenneth Sondgeroth
and His Secretary as Lacking in Foundation and Therefore Inadmissible.

In their original memorandum, plaintiffs argued that their notice of claim was filed
on November 16, 1995, but that the three day mailing rule applied. The court held that
the notice was deemed filed on November 16, 1995, pursuant to U.C.A. 63-37-1 and that
plaintiffs filed suit outside the applicable statute of limitations. Faced with untimely filing,
plaintiffs altered their position with an allegation that the letter of November 16, 1995, was
actually postmarked November 17, 1995, based upon standard office practice. The trial
court properly denied plaintiffs' motion because the affidavits are not based upon
competent evidence under Lister v. Utah Valley Community College. 881 P.2d 933 (Utah
App. 1994), and should be stricken.
Evidence of office practice must be based upon competent evidence. Lister v. Utah
Valley Community College. 881 P.2d 933 (Utah App. 1994). The affidavit cannot create
a factual dispute as to the date of service of the notice because it is not based upon
competent evidence. IdL Indeed, Lister v. Utah Valley Community College. 881 P.2d 933
(Utah App. 1994) is right on point. Lister sued Utah Valley Community College for
negligence. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging failure to serve the notice of
claim upon the Attorney General as mandated by U.C.A. § 63-30-12 and filed an affidavit
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of the lead secretary of the Litigation Division of the Utah Attorney General's Office
which established that no notice of claim had been served upon the Attorney General.
Lister responded by filing an affidavit from his attorney in which the attorney
claimed that it was his standard office practice to mail notices of claims to the Attorney
General's Office. He provided no specific evidence, however, that this notice was ever
mailed to the Attorney General's office. In affirming the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' case for failure to properly serve the notice of claim, the court stated:
Lister's proffered evidence fails to establish the existence of an adequate
office mailing custom at the threshold level. He provides no direct evidence
that the notice of claim allegedly mailed to the attorney general was ever
prepared. Mr. Snuffer does not state that he dictated a letter addressed to
the attorney general, signed it, or gave it to his secretary. Nor do we have
an affidavit from Mr. Snuffer's secretary that she typed a notice addressed
to the attorney general. We do not even have direct evidence that
Mr. Snuffer's secretary photocopied the letter addressed to UVCC or placed
it in an envelope addressed to the attorney general. In short, we have no
direct evidence whatsoever pertaining to the preparation of the letter
Mr. Snuffer's office claimed to have mailed to the attorney general.
Consequently, viewed in a light most favorable to Lister's claim,
Mr. Snuffer's affidavits are insufficient to establish a material issue of fact
as to whether a notice of claim was mailed to the attorney general.
Id. at 941. (Emphasis added).
In this case, plaintiffs' affidavit establishes only that the office routine was to review
the letter at the end of the day and place it in the outgoing mail box which would be picked
up and post marked the next day. This evidence is not competent under Lister because
neither Sondgeroth nor his secretary testify that they have personal knowledge that they
did not place the letter in the mail until after 10:30 a.m on November 16, 1995. It is just
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as likely that the letter could have been dictated and signed the day before or that morning
and mailed in the morning pickup on the 16th. Because this office routine evidence is
inadmissable as speculative and incompetent, this court should disregard plaintiffs'
proffered affidavits and strike them from the record. This court should affirm the trial
courts dismissal because plaintiffs' suit was not timely filed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court should affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
DATED this /&* day of February, 1999.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Har,
Attorneys for Defendants
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STATUTORY ADDENDUM

CITIES AND TOWNS
Part 2

Maaic{ga2lties

*1.*>1.

Municipalities as political subdivisions of the
state.
Power to sue, contract, adopt municipal name
and seal.
License fees and taxes — Application information to be transmitted to the county assessor
[Effective until July 1, 1997].
License fees and taxes — Application information to be transmitted to the county auditor
[Effective July 1, 1997].
Part 3

Municipal E n e r g y Sales and U s e Tax Act
HM-301.
10.1-302.
UM-303.
10-1-304
UM-30510-1-306.
10-1-307.

HM-308.

10-1-309.
10-1-310.

Title [Effective July 1, 1997].
Purpose and intent [Effective July 1, 1997].
Definitions [Effective July 1, 1997].
Municipality may levy tax — Rate [Effective July
1, 1997].
Municipal energy sales and use tax ordinance
provisions [Effective July 1, 1997].
Rules for delivered value and point of sale.
Collection of taxes by commission — Distribution
ofrevenues — Charge for services — CoKection
of taxes by municipality [Effective July 1,
1997].
Report of tax collections — Allocation when location of taxpayer cannot be accurately determined [Effective July 1, 1997].
Effective date of levy [Effective July 1, 1997].
Existing energy franchise taxes or contractual
franchise fees [Effective July 1, 1997].
PARTI

SHORT TITLE, DEFINITIONS, REPEALER, A N D
SCOPE OF CODE
W-l-101. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah
Municipal Code." In enacting this code, it is the legislative
°U*nt to repeal only those provisions of Utah law set forth in
"ction 10-1-114. It is the legislative intent to review, modern~* and incorporate into this code in later sessions other
^visions of Utah law relating to municipalities not included
this act. Provisions of Utah law not specifically repealed
"^11 continue in effect.
1077
I(

M-102. Effective d a t e .
*kis act shall become effective July 1,1977.

1977

; M 0 3 . Construction.
j f n e powers herein delegated to any municipality shall be
rurally construed to permit the municipality to exercise the
j. e r s S^nted by this act except in cases clearly contrary to
"* intent of the law.
1077
,(

^ 1 -104. Definitions.
** used jn this act:
i <1) "Municipal" or "municipalities" means any city of
tne hrst class, city of the second d«ss, city of the ihird
c
»ass, or town in the state of Utah, but unless the context
otherwise provides, the term or terms do not include
counties, school districts, or any other special purpose
governments.

10-1-107

(2) "Governing body" means collectively the legislative
body and the executive of any municipality. Unless otherwise provided:
(a) In cities of the first and second class, the
governing body is the city commission;
(b) In cities of the third class, the governing body is
the city council;
(c) In towns the governing body is the town council.
(3) "City" shall include cities of the first class, cities of
the second class or cities of the third class or may refer
cumulatively to all such cities.
(4) "Town" means any town as defined in Section 10-2301.
(5) "Recorder," unless clearly inapplicable, shall include and apply to town clerks.
(6) "Provisions of law" shall include other statutes of
the state of Utah and ordinances, rules and regulations
properly adopted by any municipality unless the construction is clearly contrary to the intent of state law.
(7) "Contiguous" means abutting directly on the existing boundary of the annexing municipality. "Directly"
includes separation by a street, alley, public right-of-way,
creek, river or the right-of-way of a railroad or other
public service corporation, or by lands owned by the
municipality, by some other political subdivision of the
state or by the state.
(8) "Affected entities" means a county, municipality or
other entity possessing taxation powers within a county,
whose territory, service delivery or revenue will be directly and significantly affected by a proposed boundary
change involving a municipality or other local entity.
(9) "Peninsula" means an area of unincorporated territory surrounded on more than one-half of its boundary
distance, but not completely, by incorporated territory and
situated so that the length of a line drawn across the
unincorporated area from an incorporated area to an
incorporated area on the opposite side shall be less than
25% of the total aggregate boundaries of the unincorporated area.
(10) "Island" means unincorporated territory completely surrounded by incorporated area of one or more
municipalities.
(11) "Urban development" means a housing subdivision
involving more than 15 residential units with an average
of less than one acre per residential unit or a commercial
or industrial development for which cost projections exceed $750,000 for any or all phases.
1070
10-1-105. No c h a n g e s i n t e n d e d .
^nless otherwise specifically provided in this act, the prov ^ o n s of this act shall not operate in any way to affect the
ro
P perty or contract rights or other actions which may exist in
favt>r of or against any municipality. Nor shall this act operate
in
any way to change or affect any ordinance, order or
resc
)lution in force in any municipality and such ordinances,
ordfcrs a nd resolutions which are not repugnant to law, shall
con
tinue in full force and effect until repealed or amended.
1077

10-1-106. S c o p e of act.
This act shall apply to all municipalities incorporated or
existing under the law of the State of Utah except as otherwise
s e<
P :ifically excepted by the home rule provisions of Article XI,
Sect-ion 5 of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
1077
!<H-107. Municipalities.
All municipalities which have been incorporated under any
previous act of the United States or of the State of Utah shall
be t^ ca ted as properly incorporated under this act.
1077
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(8) or in connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes;
(9) the activities of t h e Utah National Guard;
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison,
county or city jail, or other place of legal confinement;
ril) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, any condition existing in connection with an
abandoned mine or mining operation, or any activity
authorized by the School and Institutional Trust Lands
Administration or the Division of Sovereign Lands and
Forestry;
(12) research or implementation of cloud management
or seeding for the clearing of fog;
(13) t h e management of flood waters, earthquakes, or
natural disasters;
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or
storm systems;
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being
driven in accordance with the requirements of Section
41-6-14;
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of
any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk,
culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located
on them;
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of
any public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other
public improvement; or
(18) the activities of:
(a) providing emergency medical assistance;
(b) fighting fire;
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous
materials or hazardous wastes;
(d) emergency evacuations; or
(e) intervening during dam emergencies.
1995
63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity for t a k i n g private
p r o p e r t y without compensation.
(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the U t a h Constitution, immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for the recovery of compensation from the governmental entity when t h e governmental entity h a s taken or damaged private property for public uses without j u s t compensation.
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed according
to the requirements of Title 78, Chapter 34, Eminent Domain.
1991

63-30-10.6. A t t o r n e y s * fees for r e c o r d s r e q u e s t s .
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for recovery of attorneys' fees under Sections 63-2-405
and 63-2-802.
Notwithstanding Section 63-30-11:
(a) a notice of claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection (1) m a y be filed contemporaneously with a petition
for review under Section 63-2-404; and
(b) Sections 63-30-14 and 63-30-19 shall not apply.
(2) Any other claim under this chapter t h a t is related to a
claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection (1) may be brought
contemporaneously with t h e claim for attorneys' fees or in a
subsequent action.
1992
63-30-11.

C l a i m for i n j u r y — N o t i c e — C o n t e n t s —
Service — Legal disability.
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that
*ould apply if the claim were against a private person begins
to run
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or against a n employee for an act or omission
b u r r i n g during the performance of his duties, within the
^ P e of employment, or under color of authority shall file a

63-30-15

written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an
action, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to
the claim is characterized as governmental.
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the n a t u r e of the claim asserted; and
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as
they are known,
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by t h e person making the claim or t h a t
person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian;
and
(ii) directed a n d delivered to the responsible governmental entity according to the requirements of
Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13.
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian a t the
time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to the court
to extend the time for service of notice of claim.
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental
entity, the court may extend the time for service of
notice of claim.
(ii) The court may not grant an extension t h a t
exceeds the applicable statute of limitations.
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall consider whether the delay in serving
the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the merits.
1991

63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — Time
for filing notice.
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act
or omission occurring during the performance of his duties,
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, is
barred unless notice of claim is filed with the attorney general
and the agency concerned within one year after the claim
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time
granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not
the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as
governmental.
1987
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its employee — Time for filing notice.
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the
governing body of the political subdivision within one year
after the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension
of time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether
or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as
governmental.
1987
63-30-14. Claim for injury — Approval or denial by
governmental entity or insurance c a r r i e r
within ninety days.
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental
entity or its insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the
claimant in writing of its approval or denial. A claim shall be
deemed to have been denied if at the end of the ninety-day
period the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has
failed to approve or deny the claim.
1965
63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority a n d
time for filing action aguinst governmental
entity.
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action
in the district court against the governmental entity or an
employee of the entity.

63-30-16
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(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year
after denial of the claim or within one year after the denial
period specified in this chapter has expired, regardless of
whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
1987
63-30-16.

J u r i s d i c t i o n of district c o u r t s o v e r a c t i o n s —
A p p l i c a t i o n of R u l e s of Civil P r o c e d u r e .
The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over any action brought under this chapter, and such actions
shall be governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in so
far as they are consistent with this chapter.
1983
63-30-17. V e n u e of actions.
Actions against the state may be brought in the county in
which the claim arose or in Salt Lake County. Actions against
a county may be brought in the county in which the claim
arose, or in the defendant county, or, upon leave granted by a
district court judge of the defendant county, in any county
contiguous to the defendant county. Leave may be granted ex
parte. Actions against all other political subdivisions including
cities and towns, shall be brought in the county in which the
political subdivision is located or in the county in which the
claim arose.
1983
63-30-18. C o m p r o m i s e a n d s e t t l e m e n t of a c t i o n s .
(1) A political subdivision, after conferring with its legal
officer or other legal counsel if it does not have a legal officer,
may compromise and settle any action as to the damages or
other relief sought.
(2) The risk manager in the Department of Administrative
Services may:
(a) compromise and settle any claim of $25,000 or less
in damages filed against the state for which the Risk
Management Fund may be liable;
(b) with the concurrence of the attorney general or his
representative and the executive director of the Department of Administrative Services, compromise and settle
any claim of $25,000 to $100,000 in damages for which the
Risk Management Fund may be liable; and
(3) The risk manager shall comply with procedures and
requirements of Title 63, Chapter 38b, in compromising and
settling any claim of $100,000 or more.
1995
63-30-19. U n d e r t a k i n g r e q u i r e d of plaintiff in a c t i o n .
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff shall file an
undertaking in a sum fixed by the court, but in no case less
than the sum of $300, conditioned upon payment by the
plaintiff of taxable costs incur. A by the governmental ei*t *y
in the action if the plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or fails
to recover judgment.
19«5
63-30-20.

J u d g m e n t against governmental entity bars
action against employee.
Judgment against a governmental entity in an action
brought under this act shall constitute a complete bar to any
action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter,
against the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the
claim.
1966
63-30-21.
63-30-22.

Repealed.

1978

Exemplary or punitive damages prohibited
— G o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t y e x e m p t from e x e c u tion, attachment, or garnishment.
(1) (a) No judgment may be rendered against the governments! entity for exemplary or pumHve damages.
(b) The state shall pay any judgment or portion of any
judgment entered against a state employee in the employee's personal capacity even if the judgment is for or
includes exemplary or punitive damages if the state

would be required to pay the judgment under!
63-30-36 or 63-30-37.
|
(2) Execution, attachment, or garnishment may nj
against a governmental entity.
63-30-23.

P a y m e n t of claim or j u d g m e n t a g a i
— P r e s e n t m e n t for payment.
Any claim approved by the state as defined by Su
63-30-2(1) or any final judgment obtained against tlj
shall be presented to the state risk manager, or to th
agency, institution or other instrumentality involved i
ment, if payment by said instrumentality is otherwise?
ted by law. If such payment is not authorized by law the
judgment or claim shall be presented to the board of ex
ers and the board shall proceed as provided in Section 63
63-30-24.

P a y m e n t of claim or j u d g m e n t against p 9
cal s u b d i v i s i o n — Procedure b y govefS
body.
$%
Any claim approved by a political subdivision or anyJJ
judgment obtained against a political subdivision shaft
submitted to the governing body thereof to be paid fortKi
from the general funds of said political subdivision unlealj
funds are appropriated to some other use or restricted bjH
or contract for other purposes.
63-30-25.

Payment of claim or judgment against poll
cal subdivision — Installment payments.^!
If the subdivision is unable to pay the claim or award dun
the current fiscal year it may pay the claim or award ihjj
more than ten ensuing annual installments of equal size or
such other installments as are agreeable to the claimant^
63-30-26.

Reserve funds for payment of claims or |
chase of insurance created by political su
visions.
Any political subdivision may create and maintain a re
fund or may jointly with one or more other political sub
sions make contributions to a joint reserve fund, for
purpose of making payment of claims against the co-operataj
subdivisions when they become payable pursuant to thj
chapter, or for the purpose of purchasing liability insurance|
protect the co-operating subdivisions from any or all rial
created by this chapter.
63-30-27.

Tax levy by political subdivisions for ptjp
ment of claims, judgments, or insurance premiums.
(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, ife
political subdivisions may levy an annual property tax sufljg
cient to pay the following:
(a) any claim;
(b) any settlement;
(c) any judgment, including any judgment against afl>
elected official or employee of any political subdivision^
including peace officers, based upon a claim for punitrfl^
damages but the authority of a political subdivision fa*
the payment of any judgment for punitive damages ^ '
limited in any individual case to $10,000;
(d) the costs to defend against any claim, settlement, ofj
judgment; or
(e) the establishment and maintenance of a reserrl
fund for the payment of claims, settlements, or judgment!
as n a y he rea3m ib!v pr.w ^ - * *»J
(2) It is legislative intent that the payments authorized fa
punitive damage judgments or to pay the premium for such
insurance as authorized is money spent for a public purpof*
within the meaning of this section and Article XIII, Sec 5,
Utah Constitution, even though as a result of the levy tb*

STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
operation of state vehicles or equipment when he is

CHAPTER 37

(2)
^>erly licensed for that operation; and

MAILING REPORTS, CLAIMS,
RETURNS, STATEMENTS A N D
OTHER DOCUMENTS TO
STATE OR POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS

*f3) liability protection and indemnification normally
-jfbrded salaried employees.
1981
***i-l2. A p p r ° v a l p r e r e q u i s i t e to v o l u n t e e r s e r v i c e —
f^*
Rules a n d r e g u l a t i o n s .
i\) Volunteers may not donate any service to the Depart. S t o f Natural Resources or its divisions unless and until the
S t program in which volunteers would serve has first been
fj^ved, in writing, by the executive director of the Depart| 2 t o f Natural Resources and the Department of Human
Source Management.
> gTvolunteer services shall comply with any rules adopted
wtfic Department of Human Resource Management relating
Jfthat service that are not inconsistent with the provisions of
1988
Jctions 63-34-9 through 63-34-12.
CHAPTER 34a
SEISMIC SAFETY
(Terminated by L a w s 1977, c h . 234, § 10.)
044a-l to 63-34a-9.

Terminated.
CHAPTER 35

SOCIAL SERVICES
(Repealed by L a w s 1988, ch. 1, § 407.)
IW5-1 to 63-35-13.

Repealed.
CHAPTER 35a

SOCIAL SERVICE LICENSURE
(Repealed by L a w s 1988, c h . 1, § 407.)
C-35a-l to 63-35a-16.

63-37-3

Section
63-37-1.
63-37-2.
63-37-3.

When postmark date deemed filing date — When
mailing date deemed filing date.
Registered or certified mail — Record as proof of
delivery.
Filing date falling on Saturday, Sunday or legal
holiday.

63-37-1. When postmark d a t e d e e m e d filing date —
When m a i l i n g d a t e d e e m e d filing date.
Any report, claim, tax return, statement or other document
or any payment required or authorized to be filed or made to
the state of Utah, or to any political subdivision thereof, which
is:
(1) Transmitted through the United States mail, shall
be deemed filed or made and received by the state or
political subdivisions on the date shown by the post-office
cancellation mark stamped upon the envelope or other
appropriate wrapper containing it.
(2) Mailed but not received by the state or political
subdivisions where received and the cancellation mark is
illegible, erroneous, or omitted, shall be deemed filed or
made and received on the date it was mailed if the sender
establishes by competent evidence that the report, claim,
tax return, statement or other document or payment was
deposited in the United States mail on or before the date
for filing or paying; and in cases of such nonreceipt of any
such report, tax return, statement, or other document
required by law to be filed, the sender files with the state
or political subdivision a duplicate within thirty days
after written notification is given to the sender by the
state or political subdivisions of its nonreceipt of such
report, tax return, statement, or other document.
1967

Repealed.
63-37-2.

R e g i s t e r e d or certified mail — R e c o r d as proof
of delivery.
If any such report, claim, tax return, statement or other
document or payment is sent by United States mail and either
registered or certified, a record authenticated by the United
States post office of such registration or certification shall be
considered competent evidence that the report, claim, tax
return, statement or other document or payment was delivered to the state officer or state agency or officer or agency of
the political subdivision to which addressed, and the date of
registration or certification shall be deemed the postmarked

CHAPTER 36
INDIAN AFFAIRS
( R e n u m b e r e d by L a w s 1992, ch. 241,
§§ 342 to 367.)
Section
G3-36-1 to 63-36-8. Repealed.
«-36-9 to 63-36-21. Renumbered.
63-36-101 to 63-36-213. Renumbered.

date.

1967

63-37-3.

S3-36-1 to 63-36-8.

Repealed.

•3-36.9 to 63-36-21.
36-213.

1991

R e n u m b e r e d as §§ 63-36-201 to 631991

•3-36-101 to 63-36-213.
9-9-213.

F i l i n g d a t e falling o n Saturday, S u n d a y or
legal holiday.
If the date for filing any such report, claim, tax return,
statement or other document or making any such payment
falls upon a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, such acts shall
be considered timely if performed on the next business day.

R e n u m b e r e d a s §§ 9-9-101 t o
1992

1967

CHAPTER 38
CHAPTER 36a

BUDGETARY P R O C E D U R E S ACT

TASK FORCE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS

Section
63-38-1.
63-38-1.1.

(Repealed by L a w s 1991, ch. 218, § 1.)
•3-36a-l to 63-36a-4.

Repealed.

1991

Short title.
State Budget Office — Creation - - Duties and
responsibilities.

equipment when he is
; and
mnification normally

CHAPTER 37
MAILING REPORTS, CLAIMS,
RETURNS, STATEMENTS AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS TO
STATE OR POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS

1981

volunteer service —
ervice to the Departs unless and until the
d serve has first been
irector of the Departapartment of Human
ith any rules adopted
Management relating
with the provisions of
1988

f
i . 234, § 10.)

S
1, § 407.)

VSURE
. 1, § 407.)

63-37-2.
63-37-3.

When postmark date deemed filing date — When
mailing date deemed filing date.
Registered or certified mail — Record as proof of
delivery.
Filing date falling on Saturday, Sunday or legal
holiday.

63-37-1. When postmark date deemed filing date —
When mailing date deemed filing date.
Any report, claim, tax return, statement or other document
or any payment required or authorized to be filed or made to
the state of Utah, or to any political subdivision thereof, which
is:
(1) Transmitted through the United States mail, shall
be deemed filed or made and received by the state or
political subdivisions on the date shown by the post-office
cancellation mark stamped upon the envelope or other
appropriate wrapper containing it.
(2) Mailed but not received by the state or political
subdivisions where received and the cancellation mark is
illegible, erroneous, or omitted, shall be deemed filed or
made and received on the date it was mailed if the sender
establishes by competent evidence that the report, claim,
tax return, statement or other document or payment was
deposited in the United States mail on or before the date
for filing or paying; and in cases of such nonreceipt of any
such report, tax return, statement, or other document
required tiy law to be filed, the sender files with the state
or political subdivision a duplicate within thirty days
after written notification is given to the sender by the
state or political subdivisions of its nonreceipt of such
report, tax return, statement, or other document.
1967
63-37-2. Registered or certified mail — Record as proof
of delivery.
If any such report, claim, tax return, statement or other
document or payment is sent by United States mail and either
registered or certified, a record authenticated by the United
States post office of such registration or certification shall be
considered competent evidence that the report, claim, tax
return, statement or other document or payment was delivered to the state officer or state agency or officer or agency of
the political subdivision to which addressed, and the date of
registration or certification shall be deemed the postmarked
date.
1967

2, ch. 241,

1991

63-36-201 to 63lL"i

d as

Section
63-37-1.

9-9-101 to

63-37-3. Filing date falling on Saturday, Sunday or
legal holiday.
If the date for filing any such report, claim, tax return,
statement or other document or making any such payment
fallc upcn a Saturday Sunday CT iegal holiday, such acl 3 shall
be considered timely if performed on the next business day.
1967

1992

CHAPTER 38
BUDGETARY PROCEDURES ACT
2ia & i \

Section
63-38-1.

Short title.

STATUTES

68-3-12

continue to hold the same under the tenure thereof,
**ll
,t those offices which are abolished, and those as to which
gtcep
Afferent provision is made by these revised statutes.
1953

physical conditions of this state and the necessities of the
people hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of
decision in all courts of this state.
1953

4L2-& Accrued rights n o t affected by repeal.
fhis repeal of existing statutes shall not affect any act done,
right accruing or which has accrued or has been estabShed, or any suit or proceeding had or commenced in any civil
f^Le before the time when such repeal takes effect; but the
-^ceedings in such cases shall be conformed to the provisions
Jthese revised statutes as far as consistent.
1953

68-3-2. Statutes in derogation of c o m m o n l a w liberally
construed — Rules of e q u i t y prevail.
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation
thereof are to be strictly construed has no application to the
statutes of this state. The statutes establish the laws of this
state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and their
provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally
construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and
to promote justice. Whenever there is any variance between
the rules of equity and the rules of common law in reference to
the same matter the rules of equity shall prevail.
1953

lg.2-7. Effect o n limitation of actions.
When a limitation or period of time prescribed in any
listing statute for acquiring a right or barring a remedy, or
fer any other purpose, has begun to run before these revised 68-3-3. Retroactive effect.
lUtutes go into effect, and the same or any other limitation is
No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless
prescribed in these revised statutes, the time which has expressly so declared.
1953
already run shall be deemed a part of the time prescribed as
68-3-4.
Civil
a
n
d
criminal
r
e
m
e
d
i
e
s
n
o
t
merged.
ioch limitation by these revised statutes.
1953
When the violation of a right admits of both a civil and
criminal remedy, the right to prosecute the one is not merged
jg-2-8. Effect o n offenses committed.
1953
No offense committed, and no penalty or forfeiture incurred, in the other.
under any statute hereby repealed before the repeal takes
effect shall be affected by the repeal, except that when a 68-3-5. Effect of repeal.
The repeal of a statute does not revive a statute previously
punishment, penalty or forfeiture is mitigated by the provirepealed,
or affect any right which has accrued, any duty
tions herein contained such provisions shall be applied to a
imposed, any penalty incurred, or any action or proceeding
judgment pronounced after the repeal.
1953 commenced under or by virtue of the statute repealed.
1953
$8-2-9. Effect o n suits a n d prosecutions pending.
No suit or prosecution, pending when this repeal takes
effect, for an offense committed, or for the recovery of a
penalty or forfeiture incurred, shall be affected by the repeal,
but the proceedings may be conformed to the provisions of
these revised statutes as far as consistent.
1953
68-2-10. "Heretofore" a n d "hereafter" defined.
The terms "heretofore" and "hereafter," as used in these
revised statutes, have relation to the time when the same take
effect.
1953
CHAPTER 3
CONSTRUCTION
Section
68-3-1.
68-3-2.
68-3-3.
68-3-4.
68-3-5.
68-3-6.
68-3-7.
^8*3-8.
W-3-9.
68-3-10.
68-3-11.
68-3-12.
68-3-13.

Common law adopted.
Statutes in derogation of common law liberally
construed — Rules of equity prevail.
Retroactive effect.
Civil and criminal remedies not merged.
Effect of repeal.
Identical provisions deemed a continuation, not
new enactment.
Time, how computed.
When a day appointed is a holiday.
Seal, how affixed.
Joint authority is authority to majority.
Rules of construction as to words and phrases.
Rules of construction.
Printing boldface in numbered bills — Purpose
— Effect — Power of Office of Legislative
Research and General Counsel to change.

68-3-1. Common l a w adopted.
The common law of England so far as it is not repugnant to,
or in conflict with, the constitution or laws of the United
States, or the constitution or laws of this state, and so far only
** ^ is consistent with and adapted to the natural and

68-3-6. Identical p r o v i s i o n s d e e m e d a c o n t i n u a t i o n ,
not new enactment.
The provisions of any statute, so far as they are the same as
those of any prior statute, shall be construed as a continuation
of such provisions, and not as a new enactment.
1953
68-3-7. Time, h o w c o m p u t e d .
The time in which any act provided by law is to be done is
computed by excluding the first day and including the last,
unless the last is a holiday, and then it also is excluded.
1953
68-3-8. When a day a p p o i n t e d is a holiday.
Whenever any act of a secular nature, other than a work of
necessity or mercy, is appointed by law or contract to be
performed upon a particular day, which day falls upon a
holiday, such act may be performed upon the next succeeding
business day with the same effect as if it had been performed
upon the day appointed.
1953
68-3-9. Seal, h o w affixed.
When the seal of a court or public officer is required by law
to be affixed to any paper, the word "sear includes an impression of such seal upon the paper alone, as well as upon wax or
a wafer affixed thereto. In all other cases the word "seal" may
include a scroll printed or written.
1953
68-3-10. J o i n t a u t h o r i t y is a u t h o r i t y to majority.
Words giving a joint authority to three or more public
officers, or other persons, are to be construed as giving such
authority to a majority of them, unless it is otherwise expressed in the act giving the authority.
1953
68-3-11. R u l e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n a s t o w o r d s and phrases.
Words and phrases are to be construed according to the
context and the approved usage of the language; but technical
words and phrases, and such others as have acquired a
peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or are defined by
statute, are to be construed according to such peculiar and
appropriate meaning or definition.
1953
68-3-12. R u l e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n .
(1) In the construction of these statutes, the following
general rules shall be observed, unless such construction

Rule 6
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Service by mail, additional time
U.R.C.R 6(e).
Third-party practice, U.R.C.R 14.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Filed depositions.
Service upon attorney.
—Presumption of authorization.
When service required.
—Default judgment.
Appeal.
Cited.
Filed depositions.
Sealed pretrial depositions filed with a court
are presumptively public under the Utah Public and Private Writings Act (former § 78-26-1
et seq.; see now Title 63, Chapter 2) and can be
kept secret only on a showing of good cause.
Carter v. Utah Power & Light Co., 800 P.2d
1095 (Utah 1990).
Service upon attorney.
—Presumption of authorization.
Where defendant engaged attorney only to
file motion but never so notified court or attorney, appearance of attorney to file motion
raised presumption that he represented defendant in full action. Where defendant presented
no clear and convincing evidence to refute presumption, notice given to attorney of date set
for trial was good notice to defendant. Blake v.
Blake, 17 Utah 2d 369, 412 ?.2d 454 (1966).
When service required.
—Default judgment.
Plaintiff was under no duty to notify defen-

dants of default judgment entered against
them. Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen, 656
P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982) (decided before 1985
addition of reference to Rule 55).
Plaintiffs'failure to mail a copy of the default
judgment to defendants did not invalidate the
default judgment when defendants received the
notice of default in time to move to set aside the
judgment. Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. D.T.
Southern Properties, 838 P.2d 672 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).
Appeal.
Under former Rule 73(h), time for appeal
from default judgment in city court runs from
date of notice of entry of such judgment, rather
than from the date of judgment. Buckner v.
Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 124,288 P.2d
786 (1955) (but see Rule 58A(d).
Cited in Remington-Rand, Inc. v. CNeil, 4
Utah 2d 270, 293 P.2d 416 (1956); Pillsbury
Mills, Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., 7
Utah 2d 286, 323 P.2d 266 (1958); Dehm v.
Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976); Triple I Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298
(Utah 1982); Sperry v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581
(Utah 1984); Williams v. State, 716 P.2d 806
(Utah 1986); Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Maverik Country Stores,
Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 944 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at
Law § 6; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 350 to
352.
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 15;
71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 408, 409, 411, 413.
A.L.R. — Construction of phrase "usual

place of abode," or similar terms referring to
abode, residence, or domicil, as used in statutes
relating to service of process, 32 A.L.R.3d 112.
Service of process by mail in international
civil action as permissible under Ha^ je Convention, U2 A.L.R. Fed. 241.

Rule 6. Time.
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the
designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of
the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or
a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time
prescribed or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays,
Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice grv :n thereunder or by
order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1)
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended
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by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any action
under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g), except to the
extent and under the conditions stated in them.
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided for the
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by the
continued existence or expiration of a term of court. The continued existence or
expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a court to do any act
or take any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending before it.
(d) For motions —Affidavits. A written motion, other than one which may be
heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not later than
5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different period is
fixed by these rules, by CJA 4-501, or by order of the court. Such an order may
for cause shown be made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported
by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as
otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later
than 1 day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at
some other time.
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the right or
is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period
after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is
served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period.
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment inserted "by CJA 4-501" in the first sentence of Subdivision (d).
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a), (b),
(d), and (e) of this rule are substantially similar
to Rule 6, F.R.C.P.
Rule 73, cited near the end of Subdivision (b),
was repealed upon adoption of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
Cross References. — Amendment to pleadings to conform to evidence, time of motion for,
U.R.C.P. 15(b).
Commencement of action, time of service,
U.R.C.P. 4(b).
Corporation or association, mailing of process
to, U.R.C.P. 4(eX5).
Depositions, objections to errors and irregularities, U.R.C.P. 32(c).
Discharge of attachment or release of property, U.R.C.P. 64C(0.
Documents for state or subdivision, filing
date on weekend or holiday, § 63-37-3.
Election laws, weekends and holidays included in computation of time, § 20A-1-401.
Failure of term or vacancy in office of judge,
proceeding not affected, § 78-7-21.

Juvenile Court Act, time computed according
to Rules of Civil Procedure, § 78-3a-27.
Legal holidays enumerated, § 63-13-2.
New trial, time of motion for, after judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, U.R.C.P. 50(c)(2).
Order defined, U.R.C.P. 7(b)(2).
Pleadings and other papers, service by mail,
U.R.C.P. 5(b)(1).
Probate Code, mailing of notice of hearing,
§ 75-1-401.
Reference to master, time of first meeting of
parties after, U.R.C.P. 53(d)(1).
Relief from judgment or order, time for motion, U.R.C.P. 60.
Rules by district courts, U R.C.P. 83.
Service by mail, U.R.C.P. 5(b)(1).
Substitution of parties, time of motion for,
U.R.C.P. 25.
Summons mailed as alternative to personal
service, U.R.C.P. 4(g).
Time, how computed, § 68-3-7.
Tribunal, board or office exceeding jurisdiction, notice, U.R.C.P. 65B(e).
Undertaking by nonresident plaintiff, timely
filing, U.R.C.P. 12(k).
When a day appointed is a holiday, § 68-3-8.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Additional time after service by mail.
—Administrative procedure.
—Failure to add days.
Waiver of objection.
— Industrial Commission.
Computation.
—Months and years.
—Sundays.

Enlargement.
— M.^t*on for new trial.
—Notice of appeal.
Designation of record.
—Redemption from execution sales.
Motions and affidavits.
—Applicability of rule.
Court orders.

EXHIBITS ADDENDUM

WEISS & SONDGEROTH, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
5593 Highway 95
Bullhead City, Arizona 86426
RICHARD WEISS
KENNETH L. SONDGEROTH

Phone: (520) 768-5997
Fax: (520) 768-4343

July 12,1995

Kaysvilie City Corp.
23 East Center
Kaysvilie, UT 84037
Re:

Personal Injury of Joanna Banford and Amber Banford
Date of Accident 2-18-95

To Whom It May Concern:
We represent Joanna Banford and Amber Banford in their claim for personal injuries
sustained in the automobile collision of February 18,1995. David J. Quinley was driving
a vehicle which you owned that was involved in this accident
This letter is to request that you contact our office within tetfdays with the name of your
insurance carrier, or to advise us of your status of insurance at the "time of the accident
Please notify your insurance company of this accident if you have not already done so.
Please have a representative of your insurance company contact us as soon as possible but
no later than thirty days from the date of this letter. This will eliminate the need for us to
contact you further.
Thank you for your cooperation and assistance.
Very truly yours,
WEISS & SONDGEROTH, P.C.

KENNETH L. SONDGEROTH
kip:krp

Settled in 1850

Preserving Our Historic Past.. .Progressing Into The Future
•

^

Kaysville City Corporation
23 East Center, Kaysville, Utah 84037
(801) 546-1235 • FAX (801) 544-5646

Kaysville City

July 25, 1995

Mr. Kenneth L. Sondgeroth
5593 Highway 95
Bullhead City, Arizona 86426
RE: Claim - Joanna and Amber Banford
Dear Mr. Sondgeroth:
The following information is provided as requested in your letter
dated July 12, 1995:
Insurance Carrier:

Reliance Insurance Company
Policy No. JK 2537208
Claims Department
P.O. Box 16025
2390 East Camelback Road
Phoenix, AZ 85011

City Attorney:

Mr. Felshaw King
King and King Attorneys at Law
330 North Main
Kaysville, UT 84037

Insurance Agent:

Olympus Insurance Agency
Attn: Ruth Niemeyer
P.O. Box 65608
3269 South Main, Suite 102
Salt Lake City, UT 84165-0608

Please contact me as the City representative,
Sincerely,
/Dean G. Stor
Finance Director

WEISS & SONDGEROTH, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
5593 HIGHWAY 95
BULLHEAD CITY, AZ 86426
UCHARD WEISS
CENNETH L. SONDGEROTH

TELEPHONE: (520) 768-5997
FAX: (520) 768-4343

November 16, 1995

Mr. Dean G. Storey
Kaysville City Corporation
23 East Center
Kaysville, Utah 84037
Re: Claim — Joanna and Amber Banford
Dear Mr. Storey:
It was with great relief that I received your letter of July 25,1995. As you are aware, my
office represents both Joanna and Amber Banford in their claims that arose from a vehicle
accident with a member of your police force. Clearly, as is evident from the police report,
the police officer was grossly negligent and that my clients were nothing but innocent
victims. Since the accident, my clients have attempted to take all the necessary steps to
mitigate the damages they have incurred. Joanna Banford underwent radical surgery which,
while relatively successful, still leaves her quite permanently disabled.
My purpose in contacting you directly is to obtain some help with your insurance
company. Mr. Clay Stevens has been assigned this casefromReliance Insurance
Company. Unfortunately, Mr. Stevens has taken an abrupt and confrontational attitude
toward my clients which has left this office, and Ms. Banford, faced with the prospect of
filing suit to remove Mr. Stevensfromthis matter. Hopefully, this will not be necessary
once you have been made aware of Mr. Stevens outrageous and unethical conduct. I
cannot fathom anyone ratifying such conduct. The following is a brief overview of Mr.
Stevens' conduct towards Mrs. Banford.
Mrs. Banford has incurred significant medical bills as a result of this accident. Some of
those bills were paid by her own auto coverage, but significant portions were not. My
client has very limited private medical insurance which has a yearly cap. When Mr.
Stevens was asked to pay some of the medical providers that were demanding payment, he
stated, M We won't pay anything until you settle the whole thing with us." In the meantime,
the medical providers have sent some bills to collection for nonpayment. This office has
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solicited liens from all of the providers to stop such action, but some providers do not take
liens. This has resulted in greatfrustrationand worry to my client.
Amber Banford was the minor who has sustained head injuries in this accident. She
continues to suffer from dizziness and other symptoms of head trauma. Mr. Stevens has
already made an offer on her damages without knowing the full extent of the damages that
have been incurred. It is clearfromhis attitude that he is attempting to put Mrs. Banford
into such a financial bind that she will compromise the health of her child to pay some
bills. I cannot believe that anyone in a position of responsibility would tolerate this type of
unethical conduct. It is my sincere belief, that now that you have been apprised of what
has transpired, that the city of Kaysville would use whatever influence it possesses not to
condone this behavior.
Mr. Stevens has been told by my client that she is represented by an attorney. When first
advised that she was hiring an attorney, Mr. Stevens not only told her that "she didn't need
an attorney", but told her not to retain an attorney and became quite verbally abusive when
she told him that she had retained my office. Since he has been advised that she is
represented, he has continued to call her rather than my office. Furthermore, Mr. Stevens
has also responded by verbally abusing Mrs. Banford with quite lewd language.
My letter is a direct result of this behavior on his part. I do not wish talk to or deal with
this man. It is my intention to turn this individual into the insurance commission for his
conduct in this matter. I believe that your city has some influence on Reliance Insurance
with respect to the party negotiating on your behalf.
Mr. Stevens said that he would take care of the bills and pay $20,000 for all of Mrs.
Banford's damages. Mrs. Banford's injuries for her shattered knee are in excess of
$750,000. This is substantiated by settlements across the nation for injuries that have
required bone grafting and permanent disablement. Potentially it could be much larger.
I know that the mayor of your city has spoken to my clients. He appeared concerned that
they be treated well. These people are clients of mine because they are closefriendsof my
family. I expect that they should be treated well. The attitude of your insurance company
will completely dictate how this office proceeds with this claim. My clients and I are
reasonable people. However, we will not be bullied or pressured in these matters. I
believe you can understand that.
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Our office has associated with a local firm in Salt Lake City, Hadley & Hadley, on this
matter. They are one of the preeminent personal injury firms in the State of Utah.
Please advise whether you can help my clients gain a better attitudefromyour insurance
provider. I sincerely hope that we can work together to minimize this conflict and obtain
appropriate compensation for the injuries that have occurred. The process so far has been
quite intolerable.
Very truly yours,
WEISS & SONDGEROTH, P.C.
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS/^UNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT
JOANNA BANFORD, and AMBER
BANFORD, a minor, by and through her
parent and natural guardian Joanna Banford,

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs),
Case No. 970700076
vs.
Rodney S. Page, Judge
DAVID QUINLEY, an individual and
KAYSVILLE CITY, CORP., a Utah
political subdivision, and KAYSVILLE
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
j
Defendant(s).

Defendant's Motion to dismiss came on regularly for hearing before the above-entitled
court. Plaintiff was represented by Mr. William Hadley and the Defendant was represented
by Mr. Harry Souvall. The Court having reviewed the Memorandum submitted and having
heard the arguments of counsel made certain rulings and required counsel to submit additional
information on calculation of time period and took the matter under advisement. The Court
now having received additional information from Defendant's counsel and being fully advised
in the premises hereby rules as follows:
On February 18, 1995, Plaintiffs were involved in an accident with a vehicle owned by
Kaysville City and driven by a Kaysville City employee and were injured.
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Subsequently, Plaintiffs retained an attorney to assist them, and on July 12, 1995,
Plaintiffs' counsel sent a letter to Kaysville City Corporation referring to the accident in
question and asking the City to provide the name of their insurance carrier and to notify the
insurance carrier within ten days.
On July 25, 1995, Mr. Dean Storey, Kaysville City Finance Director, sent a letter to
Plaintiffs attorney providing the required information.
On November 16, 1995, Plaintiffs' attorney sent a letter to Mr. Dean Storey, Kaysville
City's Finance Director, referring to the accident claiming damages and requesting help in
getting the City's insurance carrier to provide partial payments and resolve the matter. The
letter also indicated that Plaintiffs' then counsel, who resided in Arizona, had retained a Salt
Lake City firm to assist in resolving the matter.
On February 18, 1997, Plaintiffs' filed their Complaint against the Defendant in this
Court.
Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction arguing that Plaintiff
had never filed a claim which met the requirements of Section 63-30-11 of the Governmental
Immunity Act and further, that the Complaint was not timely filed, and therefore, this Court
lacked jurisdiction.
The Plaintiffs' claimed that their letter of November 16, 1995, sent to the City's
Finance Director substantially complied with the notice requirements of the Governmental
Immunity Act and that their Complaint was timely filed. In the alternative, they argued even
2

assuming the Complaint was not timely filed that Defendant should be estopped from
invoking the one-year limitation period because of the acts of their insurance carrier.
After reviewing the law in the matter and the arguments of counsel, the Court
concluded at the hearing that the letter sent by Plaintiffs' counsel to Mr. Dean G. Storey, the
City Finance Director, on November 16, 1995 substantially complied with the notice
requirements of Section 63-30-11 of the Governmental Immunity Act.
The Court now turns to the question of whether or not the Plaintiffs' Complaint was
filed within the one-year period after denial as required by statute or in the alternative
whether or not Defendant should be estopped from invoking the one-year limitation period.
On those issues, the Court rules as follows:
Section 63-37-1, UCA, 1953 as amended, provides that any report, claim, tax return,
statement.... required to be filed or made to the State of Utah or to any political subdivision
thereof which is:
(1) Transmitted through the mail shall, be deemed filed or made and received
by the State or political subdivision on the date shown by the post office
cancellation marked stamped upon the envelope or other appropriate wrapper
containing it.
It is uncontroverted that the letter from Plaintiffs' attorney to Mr. Storey, City Finance
Director, was mailed on November 16, 1995, the date it bears.
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The law is clear that where a more explicit statutory provision exists as to the time for
doing a certain act by mail that the more general provisions of Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure do not apply.
Therefore, the Court concludes that the notice of claim filed by Plaintiff with
Kaysville City was deemed filed on November 16, 1995.
Section 63-30-14 of the Governmental Immunity Act provides that a claim shall be
deemed denied if at the end of the 90-day period the Governmental entity or its insurance
carrier has failed to approve or deny the claim.
In this case, there is no evidence that the City or its insurance carrier either approved
or denied the claim, and therefore, the claim is deemed denied 90 days from November 16,
1995, pursuant to statute.
Calculating the 90-day period pursuant to Section 63-3-7, UCA, 1953 as amended, the
Claim was deemed denied on February 14, 1996.
Section 63-30-15 of the Governmental Immunity Act requires that a claimant must file
their action in the district court against the Governmental Entity or an employee within one
year after denial of the claim. One year from the date of denial of the Claim here in question
would be February 14, 1997, a Friday. Plaintiffs' Complaint was not filed until February 18,
1997, clearly outside the one-year period.
The Court, therefore, concludes that Plaintiffs' Complaint was not filed within the oneyear period as required by the Governmental Immunity Act, but that does not resolve the
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case. Plaintiffs' have raised an issue of estoppel as a result of the alleged actions of the
insurance carrier for the City, and the Court concludes that there are questions of fact and
issues raised on that issue which preclude the Court from granting Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss at this time.
Defendant's counsel is to prepare Findings and Judgment in accordance with the
Court's Ruling and submit it to Plaintiffs' counsel at least five days prior to the time it is
submitted to the Court for signature.
Dated this JTT^day of December, 1997.
By the Court:

6<Q^W
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I , the undersigned, do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing, Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, postage prepaid, to the following:
Mr. William R. Hadley
2225 E Murray Holladay Road, Suite 204
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
Dated this / *? day of December, 1997
Clerk/ Desputy Clerk
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Mr. Harry H. Souvall
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
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RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO RECONSIDER
COURT'S RULING ON MOTION
TO DISMISS
Case No. 970700076

vs.
DAVID QUINLEY, an individual and
KAYSVILLE CITY, CORP., a Utah
political subdivision, and KAYSVILLE
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendant(s).

Comes now the Court and having previously granted in part and denied in part
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and the Plaintiff now having filed a Motion to Reconsider;
and the Court having read Plaintiffs Motion and Memorandum in support thereof and
Defendant's Memorandum in opposition thereto, and the Court having recently read the case
of Larsen vs Park City, a municipal corporation, decided March 27, 1998, by the Utah
Supreme Court, 339 UAR 17 Pub. March 31, 1998, and being fully advised in the premises
rules as follows:

The Court hereby grants Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider, and in light of the Supreme
Court Ruling in the Larsen Case further clarifying governmental immunity act finds that the
Court made an obvious error in law in its prior Memorandum Ruling.
As stated by the Supreme Court in the Larsen Case. Supra, a legal action against a city
is barred unless notice of claim is properly filed in compliance with the Utah Government
Immunity Act.
The Act requires that notice of claim must be filed with the "governing body" of the
city. The Court recognized that "governing body" is not defined in the act but is, in the Utah
Municipal Code. 10-1-101 through 10-15-6 UCA (1953)
Section 10-1-104 (2) states "governing body, means collectively the legislative body
and the executives of any municipality, unless otherwise provided: (a) in cities of the second
class the governing body is the city commission; (b) in cities of the third class, the governing
body is the city council,..."
Section 10-3-105 provides: "Governing bodies of cities of the third class shall be a
council composed of six members one of whom shall be the mayor, and the remaining five
shall be councilmen." Section 10-3-105 UCA (1953)
Kaysville City is a third-class city; and therefore, under the notice provisions of the
Governmental Immunity Act, notice in this case must be filed with the city council.
Neither the Act nor the Municipal Code provides how the notice is to be filed.
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In the matter here before the Court, notice, such as it was, was sent to a Mr. Dean
Storey, City Finance Director.
The City Finance Director is not one named for service of process pursuant to Rule 4,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, nor is his position one of significant relationship to the City
Council under the Municipal Code such as the city recorder.
The Court therefore concludes that the finance director of a city of the third class does
not have such a significant relationship with the city council that service upon him would
constitute service on the city council.
The Utah Government Immunity Act provides that notice of claim must be filed on the
governing body within one year from the date of the accident. Section 63-30-13 UCA
(1953).
Based upon the facts previously found by the Court, the accident here occurred on
February 18, 1995. Under the Statute, Plaintiff had until February 18, 1996, to file a claim
with the city council of Kaysville City. No claim was ever filed on the governing body as
required by the Act, and in fact, Plaintiffs did not file their Complaint until February 18,
1997.
Since no claim was filed with the governing body as required by the Statute and Case
Law within that one-year period, the Claim is barred and this Court is without jurisdiction.
Further, given the tenor of Plaintiff s letter to Mr. Storey on November 16, 1995, it
was clear that Plaintiffs counsel was aware that the Claim was not settled and that Defendant
3

City's insurance company was refusing to settle. Given these facts, the Court finds that there
is no grounds for Plaintiffs claim of equitable estoppel or waiver of the notice requirements.
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
Defendant's counsel is to prepare Findings and Judgment in accordance with the
Court's Ruling and submit the same to Plaintiffs counsel at least five days prior to the time it
is submitted to the Court for signature.
Dated this jMV^day of April, 1998.
By the Court:
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I , the undersigned, do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing, RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER COURT'S
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS, postage prepaid, to the following:
Mr. William R. Hadley
2225 East Murray-Holladay Road, Suite 204
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
Mr. Harry H. Souvall
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P. O. Box 4500
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Mr. Kenneth L. Sondgeroth
5525 Highway 95, Suite 7
Bullhead City, AZ 86426
Dated this J ) / day of April, 1998.
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Clerk/ Deputy/ Clerk
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

JOANNA BANFORD, and AMBER
B ANFORD, a minor, by and through her
parent and natural guardian, Joanna Banford,

FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. 970700076 PI
DAVID QUDSfLEY, an individual and
KAYSVILLE CITY, CORP., a Utah
political subdivision, and, KAYSVILLE
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Judge Rodney S. Page

Defendants.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss came on regularly for hearing before the above-entitled
Court. Plaintiffs were represented by William R. Hadley and Defendants were represented by
Harry H. Souvall. The Court, having reviewed the memoranda and having heard arguments
of counsel, and having reconsidered and granted Defendants' Motion to Alter Findings and
Amend Judgment;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED:
Plaintiffs' complaint is dismissed for failure to file a Notice of Claim with Defendants
as mandated by Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-13 (1953, as amended).
DATED this j ^ d a y of May, 1998.
BY THE COURT:

cm Rodjjtey S. Page
Honorable
District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
HADLEY AND HADLEY, L.C.

William R Hadley, E s q . ^ X ^
N:\5968\966\HHS\FINDINGS.IUD
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